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Abstract
The Thakali people of lower Mustang have a long history of economic success
fostered through community systems that function due to cooperation, but are
also characterized by competition. One of these traditional systems is 
dhikur
,a
system of rotating credit composed of approximately twenty members.
This study

examines the roles of traditional savings and credit institutions within
communities in lower Mustang in the context of the emergence of private
financial institutions in Jomsom over the last ten years. My research displayed the
strength of these community based organizations in the face of a private financial
sector where organizational requirements make access unattainable for many of
Mustang’s residents. Research was conducted through semistructured interviews
in Jomsom, Tukuche, Larjung and Marpha to gain a varied understanding of how
financial groups have evolved across communities, in different contexts. The
change and continuity that exists within traditional organizations, like 
dhikur
, is
indicative of both the adaptation and preservation of social, cultural and
economic norms in Thakali culture.
keywords
: Thakali, Mustang, 
dhikur
, credit
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Introduction
The Thakali people, the inhabitants of Nepal’s lower Mustang area, are
considered one of Nepal’s most economically successful ethnic groups (Vinding,
1998). They have been praised by anthropologists for their entrepreneurial
character and community unity which has allowed them to adapt, innovate, and
thrive amidst a harsh landscape (Bhattachan, 2015). Although the Thakali are one
of Nepal’s most studied ethnic groups, their total population is only
approximately 13,000 people, half of whom live outside of lower Mustang
(“Nepal National Housing and…”, 2011). Historically the Thakali people were
traders, but also participate in a variety of agricultural activities, such as animal
husbandry, as an additional source of income (Vinding, 1998). One of the
community systems that has greatly contributed to the economic success of the
Thakali is a form of rotating group credit called ‘
dhikur
’, which is derived from
the Thakali phrase “
dhu khor
”, roughly meaning grain rotating turn by turn
(Heide, 1988, 41). While the Thakali people are credited with the foundation of
this system, its exact origin remains unclear. 
Dhikur
has allowed members to
invest in their businesses and improve financial security since long before the rise
of micro finance, development banks, and savings and credit cooperatives across
Nepal (Vinding, 1998).
Given this Thakali “culture of entrepreneurship” my research sought to
examine the roles held by community based organizations such as 
dhikur
, in
contrast with private savings and credit organizations within villages in Lower
Mustang (Parker, 1985). I conducted my research in Tukuche, Larjung and
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Marpha, along with Jomsom, the district headquarters of Mustang, to gain a
varied understanding of how community based organizations function in different
but geographically close villages. In addition to 
dhikur
groups, I also interviewed
mother’s and women’s groups to understand the process of credit in another
community based organization, which provided added contrast and insight on the
dhikur
system. While the original intent of my research proposal focused on the
ways community organizations have adapted in the context of development and
changing economic norms, through my research I found that organizations had
adopted in minor rather than significant ways with new private financial sector
organizations posing little challenge to the traditional role of 
dhikur
within the
community. The changes that have occurred are due to economic and social shifts
within the village rather than due to a growing number of private financial
institutions in Jomsom. The barriers to access loans from private financial groups,
such as banks and micro finance, often prove too high for the majority of
Mustang’s inhabitants. In contrast to bank loans, the 
dhikur
credit system is
wellestablished and designed to be easily accessible for Mustang’s residents
resulting in a thriving informal financial sector.
Economics Among The Thakali: The Dikur System, Competition, and Gender
Roles
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Within the Thakali community, the 
dhikur
system, a form of rotating credit,
serves as “an important means of economic cooperation” (Fisher, 2001, 90).
Generally, the person in need of credit organizes the formation of the 
dhikur
group by inviting other community members to participate (Fisher, 2001). Once a
sufficient number of members are gathered (today 
dhikur
groups generally have
no fewer than 21 people) an amount of money is agreed upon and contributed by
each member so that a collective pool of money is formed (Vinding, 1998). This
sum is then given to the founder of the 
dhikur
group, who pays it back over a
time period and interest rate fixed by the group, after which other members take
turns (ibid). Traditionally, members of a 
dhikur
group would contribute grain or
even animals instead of money, and draw lots for their turn with the credit, but
this has since switched over to a moneybased system during the 1970s1980s
through which a bidding process for the loan (determined by highest interest rate)
is used to allocate subsequent turns with the credit (ibid). The reason for this
transition from grain to money has not been thoroughly explored, but is likely
indicative of changing realities within the financial sector, both in terms of
occupations and value systems. Fisher asserts that 
dhikur
“is an institution that
supports cooperation as well as encourages competition among its members”
(Fisher, 2001, 90). He states that 
dhikur
often fosters relationships from members
of different castes and socioeconomic statuses; in contrast scholars prior to

Misenti 6

Fisher, such as Messerschmidt have asserted that dhikur groups formed by
Thakalis are restricted to only members of Thakali ethnicity (Messerschmidt,
1978). Fisher states that ethnicity, age and gender do not prevent members from
joining, but argues that groups are often divided based on economic class (Fisher,
2001, 91). This is perhaps a newer opinion on dhikur group composition, but is
logical given that loan size between 
dhikurs
vary considerably, and not all loans
are feasible for poorer members. Regardless of group variety, in both ethnically
exclusive and ethnically mixed dhikur groups, members often compete for
economic success through the interest rate bidding process (Fisher, 2001, 90).
This bidding process causes those members who have the most immediate need
of the money (usually the poorest members) to benefit less, because they pay
much higher rates back to the group for the privilege of borrowing first (ibid).
This shift to a bidding system has decreased the effectiveness of the 
dhikur
system as a form of ‘social welfare’ that past scholars have often cited (Fisher
2001, Vidding 1998).
Many scholars conclude that the economic success of the Thakalis can be
attributed to cultural norms of community cooperation (Manzardo 1982, Vinding
1998, Parker 1985). Manzardo states that the Thakalis have two main principles:
“cooperation and unity between the members of the group and opportunism
toward those not in the group” (Manzardo, 1978, 581). However, Fisher (2001)
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argues that the role of cooperation within the Thakali economy has been
overstated to the point that the role of economic competition between Thakalis
has not been adequately examined. On the subject of economic cooperation and
competition among the Thakali he states that “cooperation among individual
Thakali is tempered and countered by patterns of both intra and intergroup
competition, as Thakalis compete among themselves for political and economic
influence within local, regional, and national contexts (Fisher, 2001, 87). Fisher
states that “more than any other institution, 
dhikur
may best exemplify the
tension between cooperation and competition that characterizes Thakali society”
(Fisher, 2001, 90). This debate provided an interesting point of entry for my
research when considering competition and community within the context of
savings and credit organizations, particularly within community based
organizations.
Although Thakali women still live within a patriarchal society, women’s
participation in economic and political activities is less restricted than among
many other ethnic groups in Nepal. Vinding states that Thakali women often
“engage in income generating activities” such as running inns or guest houses,
and “wield considerable political influence through their husbands” (Vinding,
1998, 211). In addition, it is acceptable for them to speak and interact more freely
in social settings with men in comparison to the gender dynamics among many
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other Nepalese ethnic groups (Vinding, 1998). Traditionally, the majority of the
participants within the 
dhikur
system are men, but Vinding states that widows
and single women also participate (Vinding, 1998). Heide states that both men
and women can participate, qualifying the statement “women who are not well
off financially often acquire a sponsor who lends them the necessary capital” (
Heide, 1988, 43). However, this personal lending is often at such a high interest
rate that it decreases the effectiveness of dhikur as a form of social welfare
(Fisher, 2001). Due to the presence of Thakali women in income generating
activities, female participation in credit and savings organizations in Mustang
may be more prominent that in other rural communities.
Ultimately, scholars conclude that the purpose and benefits of dhikur are
multifold; 
dhikur
groups functions as saving, credit, investment and welfare
resources where banks are still unavailable, or inaccessible for many. Chhetri
states that “the social embeddedness of this institution has facilitated its fulfilling
of the multifaceted role of saving to save (social relations), as an instrument of
credit, as a mechanism for reciprocity and redistribution, and above all, as an
alternative to modern day banking institutions, where people are not yet
accustomed to impersonal institutions or where access is still difficult” (Chetri,
1996, 453). Similarly, reflecting the importance of social ties within 
dhikur
,
Fisher states “rotating credit associations have social as well as financial
functions and are a form of social welfare” (Fisher, 2001, 90). These themes of
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cooperation, innovation, and competition among 
dhikur
and the Thakali people
are emphasized by all of 
dhikur
’s major scholars.
Methodology:
I conducted 19 semistructured interviews total; 18 over three weeks in
Lower Mustang and the final interview upon returning to Kathmandu, with an
anthropology professor at Tribhuvan University who has published academic
articles on dhikur and rotating credit associations. Interview participants in Lower
Mustang included members, employees and position holding members of
community based financial organizations, such as 
dhikur
groups and
women’s/mother’s groups, along with the private financial sector, such as banks
and micro finance organizations. My methods for finding interview participants
mainly included talking with those whom I had established relationships with
within the community guest house owners, shopkeepers, my home stay family
to find out who was knowledgeable and involved in 
dhikur
and/or
mothers/women’s group. I would then locate these people and explain my
project. If they agreed to participate I would orally explain my participant
informed consent form in Nepali, emphasizing that participation was voluntary
and that they could refuse to answer any of my questions. I would also ask if I
could use their name in my research before including it in my field journal and
list of interviews.
Despite my best efforts, there were several limitations to my research
project. Accessing sources proved difficult for my literature review beyond the
handful of sources in the library. Although many scholars have written on the
Thakali people their sections on dhikur generally cite the work of only four main
Misenti 10

scholarsVinding, Fisher, Messerschmidt, and Manzardo. Of my 19 interviews,
only one was entirely in English, the other 18 were conducted in Nepali, 5 of
which were a mixture of Nepali and English. Only one of my interview
participants was interviewed twice. While I was able to talk with many people
(many others informally aside from these 18) the language barrier provided a
significant limitation on the quality of information I was able to collect.
Gathering information on trends, changes, and roles essentially qualitative date
proved more difficult than quantitative data. Reflecting on my research and
interview notes, I acknowledge that the information I gathering in Nepali is more
simplistic than information I would have been content gathering in English.
However, this is a natural limitation for a language of which I did not speak a
single word less than 15 weeks ago. During interviews, I would generally try and
reconfirm information and numbers to make sure that I had understood correctly.
I take full responsibility for any misrepresented or inaccurate information
contained within this document caused by my limited grasp of the Nepali
language. In addition, I have little background on financial systems asides from a
few intermediate economics classes therefore the questions I asked were more
simplistic than those of someone with prior experience and academic knowledge
of the operations of financial systems. Numbers provided by interview
participants were most often approximate and given in ranges therefore the
purpose of this data is less for drawing precise economic conclusions and more
for understanding how organizations function within a community.
Research Findings:
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The following research findings examine organizational structure and
loan requirements of a variety of organizations with which I interviewed with a
particular focus on community based organizations in comparison to private
financial institutions, and the dynamics of the current financial network for loans
within lower Mustang. While my original research questions were largely based
around the impact of a growing number of financial institutions, I found that
changes in community based organizations were due to economic shifts within
the community rather than due to the presence of private financial groups. Across
groups dhikur, mothers/women’s groups, micro finance organizations, and
banks the stated purpose for loans by members and employees was largely the
same: medicine, agriculture, farm animals, marriage, investing in business (store,
guesthouse, etc), building a home, or buying a vehicle. Some groups generally
give loans for smaller amounts (ex: women/mother’s groups) are more suited to
smaller tasks, such as purchasing medicine, compared to bank loans, which are
generally for smaller amounts, and are therefore more suited to invest in guest
house, build a new home or purchase a vehicle.
Dhikur in Lower Mustang: Organizational Structure, Ethnicity and Gender
The dhikur system in Mustang has been a form of saving, credit,
investment and welfare among the Thakali for hundreds of years. Its success lies
in the strength of community ties as an accountability mechanism, and minimal
requirements to participate. The comparatively strict requirements of banks and
micro finance organizations have served as barriers of access to the formal
financial sector for the majority of Mustang’s residents, allowing the informal
financial sector to thrive as a source of credit. A study done by the Nepali
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government estimates
“that the volume of transaction through the informal

dhikurs
… exceeds that through regular banking system” (“Indigenous…”, 2013,
247). The number of 
dhikur
groups within any given village fluctuates based on
the economic situation within the community. Currently, the economic situation
in Nepal is more difficult than in previous years due to post earthquake
destruction and the midst of the petrol crisis imposed by India therefore more
dhikur
groups have been formed or in the process of forming to meet the growing
need for credit (Sherchan, Santosh, 2015). Due to the fact that groups form and
conclude every few years the exact number of 
dhikur
groups at any given time is
very difficult to pin down. Frequently, when I inquired about the number of
dhikur
groups within a certain village the answers I received were unspecific and
uncertain generally amounting to “
dherai
” or “a lot, or many”. The estimates I
did receive ranged from four to six groups in Tukuche, and around five to six in
Marpha (Thakali, Bijay, 2015; Thakali, Bishna 2015; Tsewang, 2015). None of
my interview participants in Larjung or Jomsom were able to give specific
estimates. It is possible that there are more groups in Tukuche and Marpha that
were overlooked by interview participants due to the fluid nature of the 
dhikur
formation process. Thakali participants may also have overlooked 
dhikur
groups
that were outside the Thakali community (such as the Dalit 
dhikur
group that was
entirely composed of women in Marpha) if they are outside their
social/community sphere.
The amount contributed by each member and the amount of the loan is
dependent on the group, with the amount varying greatly. Of the 
Dhikur 
groups I
interviewed with, loan size ranged from several thousand rupees to several 
lakh
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(100,000) (Thakali, Somar, 2015). If shares are too large for members they can be
split between several members, who then split payments to the group and divide
the loan they receive (Ibid). The length of loans and the frequency of meetings
also varied greatly, I spoke with members of six month, four month, three month,
and monthly 
dhikur
groups. For example, in three month 
dhikur
, members meet
and make payments four times a year, at the meetings the previous loan is
repayed, and the new loan is distributed. Traditionally, 
dhikur
groups occurred
either biannually or annually (Fisher, 2001). Lastly, people often participate in
multiple 
dhikur
groups simultaneously (Thakali, Somer, 2015). Of my seven
dhikur
interview participants five were involved in more than one, responses
ranging from membership in two to five groups.
Dhikur
groups are generally comprised of 2040 members who are
recruited by the person who is in need of money, who then proposes the amount
and duration of the group to prospective members (Thakali, Bijna, 2015). Usually
50% of people offered membership in the 
dhikur
group will accept. Members are
required to have two 
jamani
, or guarantors, who will repay their loan to the group
if they are unable to repay (Thakali, Somar, 2015). Years ago, only one 
jamani
was required, this has since been changed to two as a form of greater security
against default (Ibid). If one
jamani
dies or migrates, or is otherwise unavailable
or unable to pay, there is another guarantor to rely on. The majority of groups
require 
jamani 
that are not members within the same 
dhikur
group and are
permanent residents within the community. The only requirement to join a 
dhikur
group, aside from the 
jamani
, is to contribute the payments at each meetings.
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After the group is formed, a 
ghowa
(Thakali word for head, see glossary) is
chosen and rules are determined.
The 
ghowa
position is chosen by group consensus, and is generally
someone who is literate, disciplined, intellectual and honest (Thakali, Somer,
2015). Once a candidate is identified this person is asked by the group to be the
ghowa
. Members do not volunteer to be the 
ghowa
, they are instead selected and
approached by others. The 
ghowa
assists in determining starting rules for group,
keeps records of money contributed and taken for loans, and listens to requests
from members regarding loan order (Thakali, Bishna, 2015). Within the 
ghowa
’s
records fingerprints or signatures of all 
jamani
and members are included (Ibid).
The 
ghowa
is given a small salary which is determined by the group (Thakali,
Somer, 2015. The amount of the salary is based off the amount of loan for the
dhikur group (a larger loan amount and number of group members would indicate
a larger salary), this salary is also used to buy food and drinks for group meetings
throughout the group’s duration (Ibid). Meetings have a social and informal
nature; generally, after the next recipient of the loan is decided at the meeting
(often after a bidding process in the majority of groups) the recipient hosts a party
for the rest of the group (Chhetri, 2015). This gathering consists of drinking and
socializing between members. The 
dhikur
members and
ghowas
that I
interviewed praised the many benefits of 
dhikur
 as a way for members the
community to assist those in financial hardship, while simultaneously being able
to invest in their own livelihood. However, 
dhikur
members stated that when the
group is not wellmanaged by the 
ghowa
or when members do not invest funds
well and are unable to repay other members, 
dhikur
can have disadvantages. If
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the default of mismanagement causes the group to disband early, members are
left in more difficult financial situations than prior to the group’s existence
(Thakali, Somer, 2015). Given that 
dhikur
is outside government rules and
regulations little can be done in situations of default. In rural, closeknit villages
in lower Mustang, however, defaults are rare member’s ties within the
community bind them to repay, or risk shaming themselves in front of their peers
and family (Chhetri, 2015).
The person who formed the group and recruited members is given the first
turn with the credit, after all members contribute their portion of the funds
(Thakali, Somer, 2015). Originally, when amounts were contributed in grain,
dhikur
was interest free. The initial intentions of 
dhikur
were as a form of social
welfare within the community, and these intentions were reflected in the lack of
interest, easing the process for the poor (Chhetri, 2015). However, 
dhikur
has
become increasingly monetary and business driven, so that the typical interest
rate has risen to around 10% (Thakali, Somer, 2015). In contrast, personal loans
between family members and friends are often upwards of a 20% interest rate
(Ibid). This 10% general interest rate was cited in the majority of literature on the
Thakalis from the 19701990s and has held fairly constant (Vinding, Fisher).
Often lower interest rates (46%) are given for first three turns of the 
dhikur
and
the last turn (Thakali, Somer, 2015). The first three turns are reserved for the
founder and poorer, more economically desperate members. Originally, before
the addition of interest, the members who waited until the last turn were given
additional money, as a form of a return on their investment (Ibid). However, not
all 
dhikur
groups operate with a 10% flat interest rate, or a bidding interest rate
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system. One group I interviewed in Marpha, that consisted entirely of Dalit and
Tibetan women, only paid 100 rupees of interest per 35,000 loan, due to the fact
that repaying interest proved too great of a financial burden (Periwaar, Rina,
2015; Periwaar Char, Sunmaya, 2015). In addition, order was decided based on
need. If multiple members needed the loan simultaneously, order was decided
through the 
golaa
system where a members name is drawn at random, rather than
through the interest rate bidding system used by the majority of modern 
dhikur
groups (Ibid). All 
dhikur
members I spoke with stated that 
dhikur
is open to all
ethnic groups. 
Dhikur
has been adopted by more diverse groups ethnic groups in
recent years; the Tibetan man I interviewed described modern 
dhikur
as a
“remix” of the original system (Tsewang, 2015).
The involvement of women in 
dhikur 
was perhaps the subject for which I
received the most conflicting answers. All the men I asked interviewed that
women do participate in 
dhikur
, however I had a very difficult time finding
female members of 
dhikur 
groups to interview. The Tibetan man in Marpha I
spoke with said that in his group of 20 members eight are women (Tsewang,
2015). Half of the women I spoke with including those who were middleaged
unmarried (the women who would traditionally be more likely to join dhikur
groups) stated that women do not participate in dhikur, and that it is a dominantly
male activity. Some of the women I spoke with informally, who were
shopkeepers in Marpha from the Tibetan refugee camp, were not familiar with
the 
dhikur
system at all. The other half of these women insisted that women do
participate but all of them either had never participated or had participated many
years ago. The only women I was able to interview about 
dhikur
were women
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who were also involved in the Dalit mother’s group, in addition to the 
dhikur
group (this 
dhikur
group composed of nearly the same members that belong to
the mother’s group) (Periwaar, Rina, 2015; Periwaar Char, Sunmaya, 2015).
During my final interview, I learned that women commonly form 
dhikur
groups
separately from men, given different business activities and interests (Chhetri,
2015). Originally, 
dhikur
groups were formed based on kinship and community
ties. Although this still applies today, groups are now often formed based on
business interests, creating more diverse groups. However, if men and women
participate in different business spheres, or have different interests with the funds,
groups are often still divided based on gender. Lastly, an additional factor that
may deter women from joining predominantly male groups, is the social nature of
the meetings, and the drinking gatherings hosted by the newest fund recipient
following meetings (discussed in paragraph on 
ghowa
above) which could be a
potentially uncomfortable social atmosphere for a women in Thakali culture,
where women frequently do not consume alcohol in the same manner as men
(Chhetri, 2015).
Aamaa/Mahilaa Samuha Financial Resources and Organizational Structure:
Aamaa
and 
Mahilaa Samuha
, or mother and women’s groups function as
social, community and financial organizations for women in villages across
Nepal. Although these groups share many common traits, through my discussions
with five different mother’s group presidents I learned how these groups are
tailored by the women within the community to better serve members and the
community’s needs often resulting in an organization that may focus more on
one aspect (economic, social, or community resources) than another. The mother
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and women’s groups I interviewed with ranged from 1245 women; Tukuche’s
group is the smallest, with only 12 women, Larjung has 37, Marpha 35 and 45
(two separate groups, one Dalit, one Thakali), and Jomsom has 43 (Anonymous,
2015; Periwaar, Rina, 2015; Periwaar Chhar, Sunmaya, 2015; Sherchan, Ratna,
2015; Sherchan, Saralaai, 2015;Thakali, Mana, 2015; Thakali, Sasi, 2015). Many
of these groups were formed with encouragement from ACAP, and now work in
cooperation with ACAP to create resources for tourism such as the safe water
drinking stations, which then serve as a source of profit for the group (Sherchan,
Ratna, 2015). All mother’s group I spoke with also work to clean and repair
streets, benefiting residents and tourists. Community activities varied between
groups, several groups put on social events for the community once a year, while
others had created health programs, or worked closely with the library to improve
resources, or cleaned nearby monasteries and temples. Around 20 years ago,
many surrounding villages shared a single mother’s group for example Larjung,
Narikot, Kobang, Khante, Nakung all were a single group (Sherchan, Ratna,
2015). Now each village has separate group, although groups will still come
together for meetings, to cooperate on a project, or to share ideas.
All of these groups had a 
samiti 
(committee) of position holding members
ranging from three to eight women, generally including a president (
adhyaksha
),
vice president (
upadhyaksha
), and secretary (
saachiw
) (Thakali, Mana, 2015).
Some other groups also had position holding members responsible for organizing
meetings, and a separate treasurer position. All groups change positions every
two to three years, with new position holders chosen by group consensus or
rotating turn. Two years ago, both the Larjung and Tukuche women’s groups
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changed from mother’s groups to women’s groups (Sherchan, Saralaai, 2015;
Thakali, Ratna, 2015). This change was prompted from a women’s office in
Jomsom, with an effort to be more inclusive of all women, rather than just
married women. The Tukuche women’s group new official name is 
Mahilaa
Bikaas Samuha, 
or women development organization, and the Larjung women’s
group’s name is 
Mahaa Lakshmi Mahilaa Samuha Sahakari Sanstha
, Lakshmi is
the goddess of wealth, fortune and prosperty in the Hindu religion, and the rest
translates to “women group cooperative organization” (Sherchan, Ratna, 2015).
However, not all mother’s groups have made this shift both groups in Marpha
were mother’s groups, therefore consisting of only married women, the majority
of whom have children. The Dalit mother’s group mainly consisted of young to
middle aged women with small children, where as the Thakali mother’s group
had an older pool of members with adult children. Overall financial need seemed
greater among the Dalit group in Marpha than among any of the other
mothers/women’s groups I interviewed. This makes sense given that Dalits are a
lower and traditionally marginalized caste, which often affects the resources
available to them. The Dalit mother’s group also included a few women who are
Tibetan refugees and live in Chhairo, the Tibetan refugee camp across the river
from Marpha. Overall, the financial situation of Tibetan refugees is much more
difficult and unstable in comparison to Marpha’s Thakali and Gurung residents.
In addition, the majority of these women have young children and growing
families to support.
The financial aspects of these groups were structurally similar, but varied
in monetary amounts and duration, like 
dhikur
groups. The majority of groups
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reported membership fees of 100 rupees per month however, this varied in
Marpha where there were two mother’s groups within the town one for Thakali
women and the other for Dalit women. The Thakali mother’s group president
stated that there were no membership fees and no loans given within the group
there group was purely community rather than financially focused (Sherchan,
Saralaai, 2015). In contrast, the Dalit mother’s group seemed perhaps the most
financially focused compared to other mother’s/women’s groups with the
majority of women taking out loans, but membership fees of 100 rupees due only
twice a year once every 6 months, given that the 100 rupee payment placed a
greater financial strain on the Dalit households (Periwaar, Rina, 2015; Periwaar
Chhar, Sunmaya, 2015). Interest rate and loan size varied considerably between
groups. Interest rate ranged from 618%: 6% in Jomsom, 8% in Marpha, 15% in
Larjung, and 18% in Tukuche; and loan length was between 12 years. The vast
majority of loans were relatively small between 3,000 to 15,000, although
Tukuche women’s group offered loans above 15,000 (up to 100,000, 
ek lakh
)
depending on intended purpose. In groups where many women took out loans at
once, such as the Dalit mother’s group and Jomsom women’s groups, loans were
smaller, between 3,000 and 8000 with 1015 borrowers this year in the Jomsom
group and the majority of the women in the Dalit mother’s group taking out two
year loans (with interest paid annually) (Anonymous, 2015; Periwaar, Rina,
2015; Periwaar Chhar, Sunmaya, 2015). All the groups meet monthly, except the
Thakali mother’s group in Marpha met more randomly, depending on when
community projects needed to be completed (Sherchan, Saralaai, 2015). This is
likely due to the lack of membership fees and loans within the group other
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groups must collect membership fees, or distribute loans and collect interest,
therefore a more consistent and structured meeting schedule is required.
The time of year that loans are repayed and given also differed between
groups. Mangsir is the traditional month on the Nepali calendar where loans are
repaid (Thakali, Somer, 2015). In both Tukuche and Marpha loans were repayed
and given in Mangsir (Periwaar, Rina, 2015; Periwaar Chhar, Sunmaya, 2015;
Thakali, Sasi, 2015). In Larjung’s women’s group, loans are given in Pus and
repayed in Mangsir (Sherchan, Ratna, 2015). Jomsom had the most unique
schedule, with loans given and repayed once a year in Asaar (Anonymous,
2015). Default prevention policies for loan repayment were not mentioned by
Tukuche or Larjung women’s group the Larjung mother’s group reported that
members failing to repay had never been a problem to date (Sherchan, Ratna,
2015). From observing the Dalit mother’s group in Marpha I learned that, like
dhikur
, two 
jamani
are required before receiving credit (Periwaar, Rina, 2015;
Periwaar Chhar, Sunmaya, 2015). But, unlike 
dhikur
, the 
jamani
are members
from within the mothers group. In the Jomsom women’s group also two 
jamani
are required from within the group (Anonymous, 2015). It is possible, and even
likely, that 
jamani
are also required by the Tukuche and Larjung women’s
groups; the issue of 
jamani
was not directly discussed until I observed it during
the group meeting in Marpha.
Private Financial Groups:
I interviewed four of the six banks in Jomsom: Machhapuchhre Bank,
Prabhu Bank, Tourism Development Bank, and Fewa Bikas Bank. In addition, I
interviewed the two micro finance development groups in Mustang: Clean
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Village Microfinance and Laxmi Laghubitta Bittaya Sanstha. Clean Village
Micro finance has 28 branches in Nepal, but only one in Mustang (Clean Village,
2015). The Jomsom branch was opened in 2013, one year after the organization
was started in 2012 (Ibid). Clean Village Micro finance currently has 175
members in Lower Mustang, all of whom are married women (Ibid). Loans range
from 50,000 to 100,000 in amount and are paid back over one year, 18 months, or
two years (Ibid). Both the amount and time frame are dependent on the client
(Ibid). There are three requirements to be approved for a loan: first, clients must
show their own and their husband’s citizenship cards, and, second, they must
provide two photos (Ibid). Lastly, they must join a group of other prospective
microfinance members; these groups range from 540 members (Ibid). If a
members is unable to repay their loan the burden falls on the other members of
the group to repay for them (Ibid). The members of the group then participate in a
training process prior to officially becoming members and receiving their
individual loans (Ibid). Notably, the majority of clients are repeat clients who
take out a second loan after repaying their first (Ibid). Clean Village has ten
different loan types: general loan, discipline loan, alternative energy loan,
emergency loan, micro enterprises loan, foreign employment loan, hydropower
share loan, disaster relief loan, home loan and education loan (Ibid). The loans
beyond the general loan often have additional requirements in relation to the
different focuses. In addition to credit, Clean Village also has savings,
remittances, and insurance programs (Ibid). However, my research is focused on
access to credit and I have not conducted research regarding the other programs.
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Laxmi Laghubitta Bittaya Sanstha was started in 2012 and the Jomsom
branch office opened in 2013 (Laxmi, 2015). Currently, Laxmi has 405 clients,
400 women and five men (Ibid). 70% of these clients belong to a low caste while
30% are Thakali or a different midcaste group (Ibid). Loans range from 5,000 to
over 200,000 (
dui lakh
) (Ibid). However, clients are only eligible for loans over
100,000 after they repay their initial loan (Ibid). Interest is paid in monthly
installments on a “20% diminishing system”, which averages to a yearly interest
rate of approximately 11% (Ibid). Both Laxmi and Clean Village have clients
from a diverse array of villages in Lower Mustang, from Ghasa to Muktinath
(Clean Village, 2015; Laxmi, 2015). Laxmi Micro Finance has clients in eight of
lower Mustang’s VDCs (Laxmi, 2015). Neither micro finance organization has
clients in Upper Mustang due to minimal population, remoteness, and frequent
migration (Clean Village, 2015; Laxmi, 2015). Micro finance clients often choose
micro finance organizations over banks because micro finance do not require
property as collateral, removing a large barrier to access (Laxmi, 2015). Overall,
this makes micro finance groups a more accessible credit option than banks for
poorer populations. Both Laxmi and Clean Village micro finance send employees
to villages to seek out and recruit clients; employees at both organizations
reported that clients rarely come to Jomsom for their services (Clean Village,
2015; Laxmi, 2015). This is due to the fact that the majority of Mustang’s
residents are unfamiliar with the concept of micro finance therefore educating
potential clients and promoting their organization is crucial to the success of the
branch. These organizations generally identify community leaders within the
village, such as the president of the women or mother’s group (micro finance
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target population is women), and work with this individual to gather a group of
potential clients (Laxmi, 2015). However, when I spoke with the president of the
Larjung women’s group about micro finance in Mustang she was unaware of
these organizations, which may be indicative of the scope of their outreach
(Sherchan, Ratna, 2015). After gathering a group of potential clients, there is a
minimum requirement of five to six days of training and teaching before the new
group of micro finance is clients officially formed. There are two types of client
groups: joint livelihood groups (JLG) (have at least five members) and are for
clients that are registered in a certain sector (tourism, agriculture) and Gramin
banking, which is a general group, requiring no additional paperwork (Laxmi,
2015). There are four types of loans offered, but the majority of clients choose
the income generation loan (Ibid, 2015). Similarly to clean village, these groups
are responsible for repaying the loans if one of the members defaults. This
creates an added social incentive to repay, similar to that which exists in 
dhikur
groups.
The six banks in Mustang serve similar purposes for saving and lending
within private financial sector, but have small variations in policy, types of loans
offered and interest rates. Fewa Bikas Bank was founded in 2009, and offers
loans and savings accounts, currently serving 1400 clients (Fewa Bikas, 2015).
Loans are given at 910%, with interest paid monthly, with a maximum of five
years to repay (Ibid). A property evaluation is required for collateral, in addition
to client’s citizenship card and photos (Ibid). Notably, like the microfinance
groups, Fewa Bikas sends representatives to villages to recruit clients. None of
the other banks I spoke with used this approach to attract clients. Prabhu Bank
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was founded in Jomsom in 2011, only 15 days apart from the founding of the
Tourism Development Bank (Prabhu, 2015). Prabhu Bank currently has 2,000
customers, for both savings and loans, but the vast majority are for savings
accounts (Ibid). Savings accounts clients receive a 23% return on the money
within their account (Ibid). The loan amount varies depending on the client, and
is repaid with 913% interest rate (Ibid). Property evaluation as a form of
collateral is required, along with one
jamani
, citizenship card and photos (Ibid).
The Tourism Development Bank (named because head office is located in
Thamel, the tourism center of Kathmandu) has 1900 customers, 500 of which are
women (Tourism, 2015). To open a savings account only a citizenship card and
photo are needed (Ibid). As with Prabhu Bank, property evaluation is required for
collateral along with one 
jamani
blood relative of loan taker (Ibid). The currently
only have 70 customers for loans, 15 of which are women (Ibid). Loans are given
at a 1013% interest rate (Ibid). Macchapucchre Bank, the oldest bank in
Jomsom, and the oldest private bank in Nepal, was started in 2005
(Macchapucchre, 2015). They have more than double the clients of any other
financial group, with 5500 customers (Ibid). The vast majority of these are for
savings accounts, of these accounts, 70% belong to men and 30% to women
(Ibid). Currently about 30 clients for loans, of these 30 one is a woman (Ibid).
The loans offered at Macchapucchre are only for very large amounts 10 lakh
(1,000,000) to 100 lakh (100,000,000) (Ibid). The interest rate is 11% for
business loans (Ibid). As with all of the other banks, property evaluation is
needed as collateral, and in addition, property must be equal to a minimum of
60% of loan amount (Ibid). The employee I spoke with at Macchapucchre
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expressed that banks are more important in Mustang as a form of saving, more so
than for loan availability (Ibid). Some community based organizations, such as
the Tukuche women’s group, have utilized banks as saving and investment
spaces, and currently have money saved at a bank in Jomsom (although she was
unsure of the name) (Thakali, Sasi, 2015). The Macchapuchhre employee stated
that people in Mustang likely prefer dhikur because its easier to access, its the
traditional form of credit within the village, and therefore comfortable, and, he
described it as “interest free” (Macchapucchre, 2015). Although this last
statement is largely inaccurate for the majority of 
dhikur
groups today, it touches
on the idea that dhikur group interest rates are flexible and group dependent in a
manner that bank interest rates are not.
Discussion/Analysis:
Over the last 20 years there have been an explosion of savings and credit
cooperatives, development banks, and microfinance groups across Nepal. While
urban areas have been flooded by thousands of these organizations, their
emergence in rural areas, particularly mountainous rural areas, has taken place
much more slowly. With a population density of only 3.76 people per square
kilometer in Lower Mustang (compare to Kathmandu density of 13,225 per
square kilometer), and a total population of only 13,452, the number of clients for
private financial institutions is extremely limited (“Indigenous and..”, 2013)
Notably, every private financial organization in Jomsom was founded in last ten
years or less, all of them except one in the last six years. It is possible that the
effect of these institutions on community based credit organizations is still in the
process of taking place. However, from my research it seems that accessing loans
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from banks is still unattainable for many of Mustang’s residents, and with interest
compounded monthly, the overall interest ends up being comparatively much
higher to 
dhikur
’s flat payment for interest. Oftentimes, within 
dhikur
groups, the
amount of interest rate bid (example 12%) is deducted immediately before the
amount for the loan is given. Due to the interest rate, the requirement of property
as collateral, and frequent lack of understanding or distrust of the private
financial sector, the 
dhikur
system has been unaffected by their presence. My
research findings supported Chetri’s statement nearly 20 years ago that “dhikuris
seem to exist as competitors or perhaps as challenges to the modern day
institutions of banking and credit” (Chetri, 1996, 453).
Due to the strong presence of dhikur, banks have generally functioned
more as saving rather than lending spaces in Mustang. Given the data gathered, a
significant portion of the population has a savings account in Jomsom. This
indicates that a large portion of Mustang’s population are aware of the banks, and
willing to utilize them when barriers to access are lower, implying that distrust of
banks as unreliable institutions has decreased. Aside from savings, banks do
provide an additional option for loans for the upper class and those with property.
Bank loans can be appealing for those who do not wish to endure the hassle of
starting a 
dhikur
group, or wait for their turn in a preexisting group. If the loan is
needed immediately, the bank is a quicker option for those who can provide the
necessary collateral. In some cases the interest rate with the bank may be lower,
if they would have to pay a high rate within dhikur to outbid others. Micro
finance provides a middle ground, given that collateral is not a requirement.
However, it is largely a financial resource for women and is unlikely to provide a
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largescale alternate to 
dhikur
. Mother’s groups and women’s groups provide
small scale loans for a limited number of women within community. While these
loans undoubtedly have positive impacts on the community, it is only one aspect
of the purpose of mother’s and women’s groups, and does not provide a
largescale option for credit access. Dhikur offers more flexibility in comparison
to the private financial sector and more scope in comparison to
mother’s/women’s groups, and is therefore preferable for the majority of
Mustang’s residents. Despite this variety of institutions, a number of populations
still have many barriers to access. The requirement of citizenship cards by all
private financial sector institutions displays the problematic nature of current
laws surrounding citizenship and marriage and how people are prevented from
accessing crucial resources without a citizenship card. Refugees and other
displaced populations are also vulnerable in their ability to access credit they are
often less integrated within the community, and therefore have more difficulties
joining community based groups, and generally have no property to offer as
collateral for banks. Increasing the number of financial institutions in Jomsom
will not improve access to credit, unless new organizations have different
requirements. There are currently plenty of loans available for those who are able
to meet requirements, and therefore no demand for additional financial
institutions. The employee I interviewed at Laxmi micro finance stated that there
is not enough demand within Mustang to support addition micro finance groups,
given the low population (Laxmi, 2015). Mustang has comparatively lower rates
of poverty to other regions in Nepal; poverty which has partially been alleviated
by tourism and the use of 
dhikur
as a form of social welfare.
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Throughout my research I learned of several changes that have occurred
within 
dhikur
, these changes were discussed in my findings section, a few of
them reflecting the same changes identified by other scholars which are discussed
in my literature review. One of the most important changes is the shift in
motivations and intentions behind 
dhikur
, from a focus on welfare purposes
within the community, to a growing focus on business and monetary
advancement (Chhetri, 2015). Despite this overall shift, many of the 
dhikur
members and leaders I spoke with stated that their motivations for starting and
joining a 
dhikur
group were for community welfare purposes (Thakali, Bijay,
2015). Therefore, this shift towards a purely business/investment focus is a
general trend rather than the reality of all 
dhikur
groups. Another important
change is from biannual and annual 
dhikur 
groups, to groups that every three
months, four months or monthly. This is a much faster paced form of 
dhikur
that
has become increasingly common. The result is groups which start and finish
much more quickly due to the close spacing of the turns, and members receive
their credit much more quickly than in annual 
dhikur
. In a faster paced,
developing economy, the need for cash is often immediate and credit needs to be
accessed in a timely manner. However, some members cannot afford the frequent
payment periods. Another change was the shift from the requirement of one to
two 
jamani, 
which increases the financial stability of the group, and reduces the
chance of default. This was the only change that was true across all groups. The
Dalit women’s 
dhikur
group I spoke with best exemplifies a blend of
“traditional” and “modern” aspects of 
dhikur
. The group was created with the
intention of social welfare (traditional), but occurs on a monthly basis (modern).
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Interest rate is nominal, at nearly 0% (only an additional 100 rupees per 35,000
loan required to be repayed) (traditional) and order of loans is decided by the
golaa
system (traditional). The membership of the group is made up of mainly
Dalit women and a few Tibetan women, showing how 
dhikur
has been adopted
by groups independent from the Thakalis (modern). This displays how dhikur is
simultaneously a product of continuity and change with each group reflecting a
different mix of the two elements.
The strength of 
dhikur
groups in the face of an expanding financial sector
raises the question of what situations or organization would reduce the relevance
of 
dhikur
. From my research, I have concluded that 
dhikur
groups will
fundamentally change or their importance will decline in areas that lack a strong
sense of community and personal ties. Ultimately, the security of 
dhikur
groups is
dependent on trust and kinship/friendship ties between members. In the absence
of a closeknit community 
dhikur
becomes a risky investment. As long as mutual
trust between members is preserved as an accountability mechanism,. Today
many people choose 
dhikur
because they do not understand the bank process and
have personal ties within the community which make the dhikur process
comparatively simpler. If people lack these social ties and understand the bank
process, bank loans become a more viable option. In Pokhara 
dhikur
groups still
exist, but they have declined as people have adapted to using banks for business
and moved away from their extended families (Chhetri, 2015). Even within lower
Mustang, social and economic dynamics differ between towns Tukuche and
Larjung have more kinship and long term community ties as the basis of 
dhikur
.
In contrast, Marpha has a more diverse mixture of ethnicity's, with a growing
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Dalit population and the Tibetan refugee camp across the river, causing 
dhikur
groups to be adopted and joined by a comparatively diverse array of people.
Unfortunately, in Jomsom I was unable to interview anyone who was a dhikur
member. In relation to the other towns Jomsom is more “commercialized”, in that
all of the financial institutions are located there, along with all of the VDC
(Village Development Committee), and the airport is a major transit point within
Mustang. Frequently educated young people come for jobs at banks, or officials
come to work in VDC offices (Chhetri, 2015). Due to this commercial aspect,
with people coming to pursue jobs, the village is overall less connected and more
temporary inhabitants lack kinship ties. Understanding the underlying dynamics
within an area sheds insight on how financial groups, such as 
dhikur
, are utilized
and effected.
Secondly, if social and economic norms shift within Mustang so that
banks are seen as more legitimate financial resources than community based
systems such as 
dhikur
, the prevalence of 
dhikur
groups will decline. This is
exemplified by the relationship between the 
Mukhiya
and VDC officials. Many
years ago in Mustang the 
Mukhiya
informally held far more power than the VDC,
and were greatly respected by Mustang’s residents as problem solvers within the
community, while the VDC was largely ignored (Thakali, Somer, 2015). While
the 
Mukhiya
are still respected and relied upon, the power of the VDC has
increased as VDC employees are better educated than the 
Mukhiya
, and hold
influence outside the village and Mustang (Thakali, Somer, 2015). The perceived
legitimacy of organizations and institutions is crucial. When banks are viewed as
more legitimate credit sources than community based systems like dhikur, or can
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offer resources that dhikur is unable to, the number of these groups will be
challenged.
Conclusion:
While much of my research findings is heavy on quantitative data, none
of this data is available online, particularly for 
dhikur
and mothers groups. Even
banks and micro finance organizations have extremely minimal branch specific
information included on their website which made collecting numerical data that
would be readily available in other countries an important portion of my research
process, and an important aspect of future research within the topic. For future
research, a concentrated study on the experience of marginalized populations,
such as Dalit and Tibetan refugees groups is needed, in order to better answer
questions on barriers to access for credit and financial resources among groups
that are frequently economically disadvantaged. My research touched on this
issue, but was unable to explore the topic thoroughly given time constraints and
ethical concerns. I would have required greater human subjects review of my
project in order to conduct interviews within the Tibetan refugee camp. Secondly,
comparing the organizational structure of dhikur groups that exist in Lower
Mustang with those that currently exist in Pokhara would provide insight on how
dhikur 
operates in urban contexts, outside the binds of kinship ties. This would be
especially useful given that the presence of dhikur in Pokhara has generally
declined in an urban setting in the face of thousands of other private savings and
credit cooperatives. Thirdly, examining the decisionmaking and motives of why
clients of banks or micro finance organizations choose to access loans outside of
community based credit organizations could potentially reveal limitations of the
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dhikur system that have been overlooked. Lastly, a long term study tracking
dhikur
groups formation and trends within a single village or couple of villages
would provide more precise data on how these groups are evolving over time
within a constant location.
Currently, the majority of detailed and well researched literature on
dhikur
was conducted over 30 years ago. My research sought to provide current
information on the topic particularly given the recent development of banks and
micro finance groups in Jomsom. However, I found that much of the information
I gathered on 
dhikur
matched rather than contradicted existing literature. Small
changes and adaptations in loan frequency, purpose, ethnicity and gender, interest
rates and monetary amounts were noted throughout my research. Overall, the
dhikur
system has adapted in minor rather than fundamental ways to changing
financial realities, and the degree of these adaptations is very group dependent.
Today, very ‘traditional’ and very ‘modern’ 
dhikur
groups exist. Members of
current 
dhikur
groups use both traditional and modern aspects of dhikur in
tandem, creating the “remix” that one of my interviewees so aptly described.
Perhaps, this “remix” is what characterizes 
dhikur
more than any specific change
or constant aspect. The 
dhikur
group is a fluid reflection of the needs of its
members, its ability to subtly adapt is its greatest strength.
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Glossary of Terms
Asaar 
month on Nepali calendar which coincides with midJune to mid July
dhikur 
Thakali word for a form of rotating credit started by the Thakali people,
the Nepali word is 
dhikuti
.
goaa
 Thakali word for “head”, the leader of a dhikur group
golaa 
system where names are drawn at random either to determine loan order,
or to pick recipient for remaining money in dhikur account
jagga
Nepali word for property, a requirement for collateral for bank loans
jamani
 Thakali (?) word for the person chosen to back the loan taker, required in
dhikur groups, along with many mothers groups and bank loans
Mangsir
 month on Nepali calendar which coincides with midNovember to
midDecember, traditionally the month where loans were repayed in Lower
Mustang’s community groups such as dhikur.
Mukhiya 
a form of local, informal government used in Mustang.
Pus 
month on Nepali calendar which coincides with midDecember to mid
January, loans are often given in this month, if not given in Mangsir.
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